The Battle of Brandywine

mand of that and two others to oppose the enemy who were coming down on the right flank of our army. I neither knew where the enemy were, or what route the other divisions were to take, and of course could not determine where I should form a junction with them. I began my march in a few minutes after I received my orders, and had not marched a mile when I met Col. Hazen with his regiment, which had been stationed at a ford three miles above me, who informed me that I might depend that the principal part of the British army was there, although I knew the report sent to headquarters made them but two brigades. As I knew Col. Hazen to be an old officer, and a good judge of numbers, I gave credence to his report in preference to the intelligence before received. While I was conversing with Col. Hazen and our troops still on the march, the enemy headed us in the road about forty rods from our advance guard. I then found it necessary to turn off to the right to form, and so got nearer to the other divisions, which I at that moment discovered both in the rear and to the right of the place I was then at. I ordered Col. Hazen's regiment to pass a hollow way, file off to the right, and face to cover the artillery. The enemy, seeing this, did not pass on, but gave me time to form my division on an advantageous height in a line with the other divisions, about almost a half mile to the left."

This gap of half a mile must be closed, and while this was being attempted at about half-past three o'clock,¹ the English commander hurled his well-disciplined soldiers full at the unformed Americans' right wing, and a half-hour previous to this assault the British guns had opened fire.² The distance separating, the combatants was about a mile and a half, the assaulting party being compelled to cross a valley and ascend a hill slope before they came to close quarters with their enemy.

² Penna. Archives, 2d series, vol. x. p. 316.

According to Joseph Townsend, an advance company of Hessians, when they reached "the street-road were fired upon by a company of the Americans who were stationed in the orchard north of Samuel Jones' brick dwelling-house," and the mercenaries scrambled up the bank of the road alongside the orchard, still resting their muskets on the upper rails, discharged them at the small body of Continentals. This was merely an episode in the engagement, and was one of many similar incidents alluded to by Capt. Montressor, in the remark, "Some skirmishing began in the valley in which the enemy was drove."³ The American artillery Sullivan had placed in the centre of the line, where he had taken his position, and he ordered the guns discharged as quickly as possible to stop the progress of the British and to give the brigade under DeBorre time to form, for that body had been thrown "into the worst kind of confusion" before the assaulting party was upon them, and although Sullivan sent four of his aids, two of whom were killed in the effort to adjust the disorganized division, and had gone himself to rally the men who had fallen out of ranks, he succeeded only in partly forming there a line of battle.

Conscious that the artillery on the centre commanded both the right and left of the line, he returned to that point, determining to hold the position as long as possible, knowing that if it was carried "it would bring on a total rout, and make a retreat very difficult." The right, however, was demoralized, and though some of the troops in that division were rallied and made a show of resistance, the greater portion could not "be brought to do anything but fly." In front of the American left was a plowed field, and the attack at this point was made by the Guards, the First British Grenadiers, and Hessian Grenadiers; and although it was claimed by Gen. Howe that, notwithstanding a heavy fire of artillery and musketry, his troops pushed the rebels at once from the position they had taken, the fact is that for nearly an hour the struggle for the possession of the summit was continued, and although five times did the British soldiers drive the American troops from the hill, as often was it retaken. The regiments of Drayton, Ogden, and Hazen's "Congress' Own" stood firm on the left, while the resistance of Stirling and Stephens was highly creditable, the main defense being made by the centre, where Sullivan exhibited great personal courage, and doubtless by his example animated his men in their contest with an overwhelming force. At length the left wing broke and fled, pursued by the Guards and Grenadiers into a thick woods, whence the larger part of the American troops escaped, while the English were "entangled, and were no further engaged during the day." The centre still remained firm; and here Gen. Conway, by the good conduct of his brigade, gained considerable reputation for himself (which he subsequently tarnished at Valley Forge), the Twelfth Pennsylvania, under his command, suffering very heavy loss. Cornwallis now turned the whole fire of his artillery on the small body of men who still stood in line, and they were soon compelled to retire, a movement which was effected with some degree of steadiness and an occasional resumption of the offensive, since they took with them their artillery and baggage.

The noise of heavy ordnance almost due north from Chad's Ford apprised Knyphausen that Gen. Howe had succeeded in turning the right wing of Washington's army, and, although the musketry firing could be distinctly heard, it was not until an hour before the sun's setting that the Hessian commander made the attempt to cross at the ford.⁴ It is doubtful whether